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Abstract 
This paper is an intervention in recent debates about conceptual and normative theorizations 
of human rights, which have been increasingly characterised by a divide between ‘moral’ and 
‘practice-based’/’political’ understandings. My aim is to articulate an alternative, pragmatist 
understanding of human rights, one that is importantly distinct from the practice-based 
account with which it might be thought affiliated. In the first part of the paper, I reveal the 
fundamental flaw in the practice-based account of human rights: I argue that it is undermined 
by the ontological thesis at its heart, which naturalises and reifies political arrangements and 
institutions that are radically contingent. In the second part, I identify, and outline the 
attractiveness of, a pragmatist normative account of human rights. In contrast to the practice-
based approach, this pragmatist account construes human rights in ideational terms. The 
pragmatist understanding accepts both the contingency of our practices and the cultural limits 
to moral justification, while nevertheless retaining a commitment to the enterprise of 
normative philosophical conversation. I argue, in contrast to prevailing interpretations, that 
the international theory advanced by John Rawls exemplifies a pragmatist account of human 
rights and points a way forward for theoretically fruitful but appropriately circumscribed 
analysis of the concept.  
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Pragmatism, Practices, and Human Rights 
Robert Lamb 
 
Introduction 
There has been an explosion of interest in human rights within normative political theory in 
recent years. As scholarly debates have developed, one particularly noteworthy theoretical 
divide has emerged, between those who offer an idea-focused, moral account of human rights 
on the one hand, and those who advocate a practice-based, political account on the other. The 
disagreement turns on whether the conceptual and normative meaning of human rights should 
be gleaned from consideration of it as an abstract moral idea or through analysis of its 
practical role in real-world international politics.
1
 Since the articulation of this distinction, 
philosophers have advanced further defences from within each camp, and something of an 
impasse has been reached.
2
 In his assessment of contemporary theoretical debates, Vittorio 
Bufacchi concludes that ‘the only consensus about human rights is that there is no 
consensus’.
3
 In a less charitable judgement, Jeremy Waldron complains that ‘the whole field 
is a bit of a mess’.
4
 
In this paper, I address the debate between moral and practice-based approaches to 
human rights and present a way out of the current scholarly impasse. I identify, and outline 
the attractiveness of, a distinct pragmatist understanding of human rights that appears to 
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avoid the deficiencies that bedevil the moral and practice-based approaches. In doing so, I 
provide a novel, but vital, differentiation of the pragmatist understanding from the recently 
ascendant practice-based approach with which it may mistakenly be thought related or even 
equivalent. As Matthew Festenstein points out, pragmatists hold a ‘methodological 
commitment to the primacy of practice’, which means that ‘inquiry is a problem-solving 
activity’, wherein ‘we can only begin to reason and deliberate on the basis of the beliefs and 
practices that we have’.
5
 It may therefore be tempting to conflate the two approaches and 
think that pragmatism implies an endorsement of the thesis that practices have interpretive 
authority in the understanding of political concepts. As I will show, however, we can make 
sense of a coherent and attractive pragmatist understanding of human rights that has nothing 
substantively in common with the practice-based approach. I show that rather than 
misguidedly insisting on the interpretive authority of practices in political analysis, 
pragmatism instead licences a concern with ideas. It thus can embolden a (significantly 
augmented) moral understanding of human rights. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In the first part, I tackle the debate between 
moral and practice-based approaches directly, primarily to expose problems with the latter. 
Advocates of a practice-based account are united in their insistence that any conceptual and 
normative account of human rights must defer to its practical function and role in 
international politics. I argue that the practice-based account fails fundamentally on its own 
terms and in a way that points us firmly towards the primacy of an ideational understanding 
of the concept. I show that the practice-based understanding of human rights implies a 
dangerous reification of, and deference to, established political institutions. This reification is 
based on a misunderstanding of the nature of practices: the practice-based theory relies on a 
dubious ontological commitment that naturalises political arrangements that should be 
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understood as rooted in individual intentionality and therefore radically contingent. Against 
advocates of the practice-based approach, I conclude that human rights must be construed in 
ideational rather than practical/institutional terms. 
 In the second part of the paper, I outline an alternative, pragmatist normative 
theorization of human rights. Such a pragmatist account can, I suggest, retain a focus on 
human rights as a moral idea while nevertheless responding to the political and philosophical 
scepticism that motivates the practice-based approach. I argue that we can plausibly 
appreciate moral theorizations of human rights as expressions of normative values that are 
universalistic in content, but culturally particular in terms of their justificatory scope. To 
explain and vindicate this argument, I turn first briefly to the work of Richard Rorty, and then 
in much more detail to that of John Rawls. In a sympathetic explanation of his normative 
international theory, I demonstrate that Rawls’ understanding of human rights has been 
persistently misunderstood and misrepresented by advocates of the practice-based approach 
(who mistakenly regard him as an ally), as well as its critics. I show how Rawls’ international 
theory exemplifies a pragmatist philosophical account of human rights that is characterised 
by an analysis of moral values rather than political practices. In contrast to the reifications of 
the practice-based approach to human rights and what might be thought the naïve 
universalism of the moral approach, Rawls’ pragmatist alternative draws attention to the 
contingency of our inherited traditions, while simultaneously enabling productive 
philosophical conversation about the substantive content of a political value with 
considerable emancipatory potential.  
 
PART I: The Practice-Based Approach to Human Rights and the Primacy of Ideas 
The practice-based approach to human rights that has emerged in recent scholarship has been 
developed in response to a perceived moralistic theoretical orthodoxy. The exemplary 
5 
 
expression of the contemporary moral approach is James Griffin’s On Human Rights.
6
 In that 
work, Griffin aims to illuminate the normative and conceptual distinctness of human rights. 
For him, the idea of human rights has a unique place in our normative vocabulary. A concern 
with human rights is not, he points out, equivalent or reducible to a broader interest in the 
concepts of justice or morality.
7
 He thus intends his analysis to account for the theoretical 
specificity of human rights, such that we can both explain its moral underpinnings and 
determine its practical, political entailments.
8
 Griffin argues that both the justificatory 
grounding for, and the practical content of, the idea of human rights can be linked to a 
distinct concept of ‘personhood’ rather than any more general moral value (such as equality) 
or any claimed biological fact about the human species (such as any account of our physical 
features).
9
 He suggests that analysis of personhood – and the commitment to ‘normative 
agency’ it implies – can provide a means to both identify the bearers of human rights and 
reveal the appropriate political manifestations of that idea.
10
  
Griffin describes his own method as a ‘bottom-up’ conceptual explication, and he 
therefore thinks that personhood is not in itself sufficient to give the idea of human rights 
determinate content. His theory is thus explicitly committed to a twin grounding of 
personhood with the ‘practicalities’ that will be relevant to determining the normative content 
of human rights.
11
 It is nevertheless a chiefly abstract and philosophical approach to human 
rights and involves the dialectical reasoning and conceptual analysis rooted in appeals to 
moral and linguistic intuitions typical of contemporary moral philosophy.
12
 While one of 
Griffin’s objectives is to establish a framework to determine the normative political demands 
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of human rights, his approach does not involve much reference – and certainly no deference – 
to human rights law or practice.
13
 For him, ‘we should be neither surprised nor especially 
troubled by some discrepancy between the list of human rights that emerges from a theorist’s 
deliberations and the lists that are enshrined in law’.
14
 The role of the philosopher is thus not 
to consult legal or political practice as an authoritative source, but instead to provide a 
comprehensive account of the idea of human rights in moral terms. 
 Dissatisfaction with this moralistic understanding of human rights has motivated 
advocates of the practice-based alternative, which has been developed most programmatically 
by Charles Beitz.
15
 In his (somewhat inappositely titled) The Idea of Human Rights, Beitz ties 
the meaning of the concept to its practical instantiation in the world. He laments 
‘philosophers [who] have conceived of human rights as if they had an existence in the moral 
order that can be grasped independently of their embodiment in international doctrine and 
practice’.
16
 In place of the moralistic assumption that human rights ‘express and derive their 
authority from some…deeper order of values’, Beitz insists instead that an adequate 
understanding of the concept must ‘take account of the functions that the idea of a human 
right is meant to play, and actually does play, in the practice’ of international politics.
17
 The 
definitive characteristic of Beitz’s approach is that it is the practice of human rights – rather 
than any more fundamental moral or ideational commitment – that determines its conceptual 
and normative meaning. For him, crucially, ‘a practical approach does more than notice that a 
practice of human rights exists; it claims for the practice a certain authority in guiding our 
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thinking about the nature of human rights’.
18
 ‘The meaning of the idea of a human right’, he 
elaborates, ‘can be inferred from its role in a discursive practice’.
19
  
It is important to stress that the inferential authority of practices is, on this 
understanding, necessarily normative as much as conceptual; indeed, it is normative because 
it is conceptual. The boundaries for normative theorizing are inevitably fixed by the 
definitional terms of the concept being discussed – the terms of the conceptual definition 
frames and limits the normative possibilities available. The implication is that any normative 
account of a concept that strays beyond practice is, as a matter of verifiable fact, no longer 
addressing that concept. When engaging in normative theorization, we must, according to 
Beitz, attend to the ‘doctrine and practice of human rights as we find them in international 
political life as the source materials for constructing a conception of human rights’.
20
 He thus 
defines the idea of human rights in terms of what he regards as its essential, practical function 
in international relations.
21
 This function is, he claims, to provide an evaluative behavioural 
standard that states must meet in terms of their domestic conduct. Within the international 
order, human rights provide reasons for action to states as responsive agents. The practical 
role of human rights is – upon their violation – to motivate and justify international 
intervention.
22
 So, when a state fails to protect the human rights of its people, it can expect 
some justified ‘remedial or preventive action by the world community or those acting as its 
agents’ in response.
23
   
Along very similar lines, Andrea Sangiovanni maintains – or at least did so when he 
first wrote on this subject – that any determination of the specific content of human rights 
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must attend to their formal functions within established institutions.
24
 For him, this means 
that ‘rather than aim for a conception of [normative] right in general’, it is instead necessary 
for theorists to begin ‘from social and political institutions as they are here and now’.
25
 The 
practical role of a particular right is here again taken to have authority in determining its 
conceptual and normative meaning. For Sangiovanni, any assessment of the normative and 
conceptual possibility of a human right requires the eschewal of reference to abstract moral 
values, such as Griffin’s idea of personhood. Such an assessment should rather be concerned 
to ask, ‘what role is this right meant to play in actual political conflicts?’ before the 
possibility of such a right can be countenanced.
26
 This test of functionality is likewise crucial 
for Joseph Raz’s political account of human rights. For Raz, the relevant measure is the 
‘enforceability’ of a human right: his claim is that ‘where there is no possibility of fair and 
reliable enforcement, there is no human right’.
27
 This argument trades on the core assumption 
that rights are, by definition, enforceable claims, and that in the universalistic terms of human 
rights, this implies the existence of international legal norms, rules, and institutions.  
For Beitz, Sangiovanni, and Raz, normative analysis depends on a conceptual 
understanding that must defer to real-world practice. Their shared view is that the conceptual 
and normative meaning of human rights must be determined through reference to political 
realities: we understand the nature of this concept - and draw normative conclusions about it 
– through attention to its function in the international order, rather than via abstract 
philosophical analysis of distinct moral values. If theorists wish to consider whether there 
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should be, for example, a human right to democratic participation or freedom of speech, we 
must establish first whether such a right would correspond to the function that human rights 
serve in the international community.  
I wish now to suggest that there are fundamental and insurmountable problems with 
the practice-based approach to human rights that stem ultimately from the indefensible 
ontological commitment at its heart. We can uncover this ontological commitment by 
focusing on what Beitz regards as the statist character of the practice of human rights. 
According to his view, 
‘…a practice of human rights…might be described as “statist” in at least two senses: 
its standards apply in the first instance to states, and they rely on states, individually 
and in collaboration, as their principal guarantors….[T]he centrality of states to the 
practice of human rights cannot be denied….The basic facts are clear. The political 
structure of the world consists of a system of territorially defined political units, each 
claiming to exercise legitimate political authority within its borders’.
28
 
 
Beitz is here explicit that deference to the authority of practices involves a recognition that, in 
the world in which we inhabit, states are the politically significant unit, and that human rights 
must be understood in such terms. The relevant ‘facts’ of the matter are, for him, that states 
exist in the world, maintain international society, and are the agents tasked with protecting 
the human rights of their citizens. 
 At an empirical level, Beitz’s observations about the role of states in the international 
system seem accurate. States are the unitary agents capable of establishing binding 
agreements and they are the (customarily relevant) subjects of international law. It is also the 
case that states are the entities responsible for the protection of human rights, in political as 
well as legal discourse. Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
declares, for instance, that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence 
within the borders of each state’. This statement evidently only makes sense in a world of 
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bordered sovereign states. In addition to the plausibility of Beitz’s empirical claims, there are 
also numerous arguments for the normative significance of states, with increasingly 
sophisticated explanations as to why established territorial borders might be of moral 
importance in ways unacknowledged by advocates of cosmopolitan liberalism.
29
 Beitz’s 
reasoning – his argument from the factual existence of states – is nevertheless problematic 
insofar as it acts to reify and naturalise existing political arrangements and institutions that 
are entirely contingent, malleable, and dependent on ideational commitments. The ascription 
of political authority to already existing institutions misunderstands how practices relate to 
ideas.  
We can appreciate this misunderstanding by turning to the influential account of 
social ontology put forward by John Searle, which is invoked authoritatively by Beitz. In his 
reference to Searle, Beitz mentions his ‘account of the progression from “social fact” to 
“institutional fact”’, which, it is claimed, can explain the interpretive primacy ascribed to the 
functional role of human rights within the practice-based approach.
30
 According to Searle, the 
key characteristic of social facts – in contrast to ‘brute facts’ – is that their existence is wholly 
dependent on human agreement and collective intentionality. His favoured example is 
money, which can exist as a brute fact in its physical form (as dollar bills and such) 
regardless of any intentionality, while its status as a social fact (as medium of exchange 
within an economy) requires a set of specific human beliefs about its agreed function.
31
 Such 
social facts then become institutional facts when their recognition is codified through the 
formal identification of relevant rules and the assignation of required rights and duties.
32
  
                                                 
29
 Mathias Risse, On Global Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Lea Ypi, Global Justice and 
Avant-Garde Political Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
30
 Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, p. 9, n. 13; John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: The 
Free Press, 1995), pp. 79-112. 
31
 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, pp. 37-43. 
32
 In his discussion of institutional facts, Searle mentions the existence of human rights, which he regards as an 
‘amazing’ example of the phenomenon, because the relevant ‘status-function’ is the sole criterion of being 
11 
 
Searle’s understanding of the ‘logical structure of institutional reality’ is, however, 
very different from that suggested by Beitz and serves to undermine, rather than underpin, the 
practice-based thesis.
33
 For Searle, it is the ideas – the collective intentionality (beliefs and 
desires) – of the actors involved that both creates and maintains institutional facts. Once an 
institutional fact has been established, and the relevant rules, rights, and duties codified, this 
does, in his view, create a new sub-class of social reality: when money becomes 
institutionalised as a medium of exchange rather than merely socially accepted as such, this 
represents an important shift in the lived reality of a society, one that is bound to influence 
the attitudes and actions of the individuals therein. This shift to institutional facts nevertheless 
does not have the implications that Beitz seems to think it has. Indeed, as Searle’s analysis 
implies, and as he explicitly insists, the continued existence of institutional reality is 
dependent entirely on the continued existence of relevant ideational commitments rather than 
on any new or separate institutional authority.
34
 It is the beliefs and desires of individuals that 
remain authoritatively relevant to accounts of human behaviour within the framework of 
institutional rules and not the institutional rules themselves. 
Social practices/institutions and their associated rules cannot be ascribed any such 
explanatory authority (or ontological primacy) because their very existence is explained by 
the existence of ideational commitments. Even though Searle is interested in what he calls the 
‘structure’ of institutions, this term does not imply any fixity or determinacy for any account 
of human action. It may be the case that individuals act in accordance with institutional rules 
because they are motivated to do so by the existence of such rules. We know, however, that 
we cannot reduce that intentional motivation to the force of the rules themselves. We know 
this because our experience of the world shows us that individuals ignore such rules on 
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various occasions, even when the consequences and risks of doing so are significant. Searle 
instances the 1992 Los Angeles riots and subsequent looting, and the suddenness of the fall of 
the Soviet Union, as obvious examples of large-scale rejections of the claimed authority of 
institutional facts. Such phenomena are attributable to nothing more than shifts in 
intentionality.
35
  
An important element of Searle’s theory is the rejection of any ‘sharp dividing line’ 
between social facts and institutional facts.
36
 He uses the example of war to show the 
slipperiness of the distinction between the two. While we may have an established social 
understanding of what constitutes a war, this may be quite different from the codified, legal 
definition of war, which, in turn, is open to significant negotiations and alterations.
37
 The 
status of human rights would seem to be exactly akin to war in this respect. Although it is 
true that human rights have a specific legal meaning in international law and so exist as an 
institutional fact, it is also the case that they exist as a broader social fact recognised across 
various intellectual and cultural traditions. The iconic status of the UDHR – a document that 
has no formal status in international law – is striking evidence of this social fact. It came into 
being as an expression of supra-legal universalistic principles and continues to be invoked as 
a morally authoritative statement of values in global political contexts. Furthermore, there is 
no reason why the rights enumerated in this document could not become part of the 
institutional reality of human rights, since that too is open to a political rethinking at any 
moment. It could, of course, be the case that recognition of the existence of human rights as a 
social fact does not always result in their successful protection. This is unsurprising, 
however, since the protection of human rights – or any rights, for that matter – is never 
absolutely assured in practice, even when institutionalised.  
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It is not necessary to embrace the entirety of Searle’s account of social ontology to 
appreciate how it fatally undermines the practice-based approach.
38
 As shown, the practice-
based approach asserts that the normative meaning of human rights depends upon its 
conceptual meaning, which is, in turn, comprehensible only through deference to institutional 
reality. Normative theorizing is thus inextricably tied to a conceptual definition that is 
manifested in practice. The relevant and insurmountable challenge that Searle’s theory issues 
to that approach is to explain how and why practices could ever have interpretive authority in 
determining the meaning of concepts that then frame and limit normative enquiry, when it is 
practices that are parasitic on concepts and not vice versa. It shows that institutional reality is 
ultimately ideational in nature, and is maintained by individual intentionality, such that 
practices do not have the independent authority that they would need to have to fix the 
meaning of concepts in the manner suggested by Beitz et al.  
Searle’s account of social ontology shows us where the reasoning behind the practice-
based thesis goes awry. In its suggestion that we can only understand concepts through 
deference to practices, it effectively ascribes practices a kind of ontological authority and 
priority over the ideas that generate them. In doing so, it insists that institutional reality is a 
fixed entity in the world, rather than an object of ideational creation and contestation. Beitz 
suggests that we can only understand the idea of human rights by looking at its institutional 
manifestation, whereas that very manifestation has a nature and a plasticity that derives from 
an ideational content that must have interpretive primacy. Acknowledgement of this 
ideational primacy then implies that human rights is, for the political theorist, first and 
foremost, just that: an idea, comprised of a set of conceptual and normative beliefs. These 
beliefs include, for example, that individuals have some rights solely by virtue of their 
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membership of a community of humans, that those rights are inviolable, inalienable, and so 
on. One may, of course, find this idea unconvincing or fanciful, and there could be various 
and divergent accounts of its justification, but this does not threaten its status as an idea.  
The upshot of the interpretive primacy of ideas is that the core thesis of the practice-
based approach falls away. Discursive practices and established institutions cannot be taken 
as conceptually authoritative because such practices and institutions are themselves ultimately 
ideational in their nature, and their existence depends on the intentionality of the actors 
involved. The deference to political reality required by the practice-based account ultimately 
reifies and naturalises the network of agreements that is radically contingent: it ascribes a 
concrete existence that it does not possess, which, in turn, implies its fixity in the political 
landscape. Deference to practical reality seems especially inappropriate – and its reification 
particularly dangerous – in the case of human rights, given that the historical emergence of 
the relevant institutions and discourses (such as the UN and UDHR) has been relatively 
recent and has often taken a form that reveals a very specific (and contestable) interpretation 
of the core ideas they are supposed to express and protect. Such deference puts artificial 
limits on the imagination of political philosophy. 
We can illustrate this concern through focusing on the concept of states that Beitz 
thinks is necessarily central to the concept of human rights. Beitz worries that we cannot 
make sense of human rights as the pre-institutional natural rights articulated in early-modern 
and modern political thought. Unlike natural rights, human rights – such as political asylum – 
depend on the fact of a statist global framework and corresponding institutions rather than a 
state of nature. For Beitz, ‘the essence of such rights is to describe features of an acceptable 
institutional environment’.
39
 This view instructively encapsulates the misunderstanding of the 
relationship between ideas and institutions that defines the practice-based approach. Although 
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abstract moral concepts can obviously imply institutional commitments, the precise nature of 
these commitments is almost always – and certainly in the case of human rights – open-
ended. We know that ideas like dignity and equality are normative values capable of 
simultaneously commanding widespread support while nevertheless also housing deep 
disagreement over their practical entailments. Such ideas have no straightforward, 
uncontroversial, essential institutional implications. Even when institutions are established in 
the name of such abstract normative values, their natures and practices are always subject to 
subsequent revision, because their interpretation and ideational contestation is continuous. 
The concept of human rights is such an abstract idea and is open to various 
institutional interpretations. As suggested, a very basic definition of human rights is that 
individuals have a set of universal entitlements that they possess merely in consequence of 
their humanity. This idea clearly permits different interpretations and one might conceivably 
argue that the dominant statist version is an inadequate one, because it solidifies political 
borders that are (in principle) historically contingent and (in fact) have, until relatively 
recently, been very different in both their composition and their porousness. It may be the 
case that the right to asylum in the UDHR assumes the existence of borders and states, but 
that is no reason for political theorists to do likewise when conceptualising the nature and 
normative demands of human rights. In a world without states, the right to asylum would 
certainly need an alternative guarantor, but it could still plausibly be considered a human 
right, one that some relevant agent is bound to protect. States embody practices and 
institutions, and practices and institutions reflect and instantiate ideas: the ascription of 
conceptual (and therefore) normative authority to practices wrongly denies this and reifies 
one specific, contingent, and arguably impoverished (statist) understanding of the idea of 
human rights.  
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PART II: A Pragmatist Approach to Human Rights – Re-reading Rawls’ International Theory 
The Searlean account of social ontology reveals the interpretive primacy of ideas over 
practices in conceptual understanding, but it does not offer any clue as to how we might best 
theorize about normative values like human rights. So, having indicated the flaws in the 
practice-based/political approach to human rights, I now turn to explicate an alternative, 
pragmatist understanding of the concept. As noted in the introduction, pragmatism is an 
intellectual tradition that has an important methodological association with practices. It may 
therefore seem intuitive to conflate a pragmatist understanding of human rights with a 
practice-based approach to political concepts. As I will show, however, the two share nothing 
substantive in common, because a plausible pragmatist understanding can make sense of the 
ideational construal of human rights that the practice-based approach denies as a matter of 
principle. I will further argue that a pragmatist account of human rights – exemplified by a 
seemingly unorthodox, but nevertheless accurate and faithful interpretation of Rawls’ 
international theory – can overcome the deficiencies of both the practice-based understanding 
and the moralistic alternative. First, some terminological disclaimers: in ascribing to Rawls a 
pragmatist account of human rights, I do not wish to suggest that he would necessarily have 
endorsed this label, nor that it is necessarily an appropriate description of the philosophical 
identity of his whole body of work, and nor finally that his theory in any way defines or 
exhausts the contribution that this tradition of thought can make to understanding the concept 
in question.
40
 I am rather using pragmatist as the best available descriptor for what I argue is 
Rawls’ distinctive philosophical approach to the analysis and justification of human rights.  
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Though diverse as an intellectual tradition, the modern incarnation of pragmatism in 
normative political philosophy is characterised chiefly by a rejection of any concept of trans-
cultural, supra-historical, or final understanding of truth. Normative principles are instead 
thought to require justificatory underpinnings that are provisional, contestable, and, above all, 
local. As Festenstein observes, for the pragmatist, ‘moral theories are seen as historical 
products, expressing and embodying the societies that produce and sustain them’.
41
 A 
pragmatist reading of Rawls’ international theory, I suggest, accurately captures both the 
moral and ideational character of his understanding of human rights as well its consciously 
restricted justificatory scope. We can thus use Rawls to delineate the intellectual distance 
between pragmatism and practices. The pragmatist account of human rights that emerges 
from Rawls’ theory can, I argue, potentially overcome the impasse between moral and 
practice-based approaches to human rights: it can simultaneously reject the practice-based 
understanding and rise to the challenge of scepticism by recasting the moralistic approach as 
a culturally limited justificatory project, and thus can carve a path that escapes that the pitfalls 
that advocates of each position face. 
We can begin to see the appeal of the pragmatist account of human rights by 
considering first what might make the turn to practices (and corresponding turn away from 
abstract moralising) appear attractive. Its exponents regard the practice-based approach as 
attractive, in part, because of the challenges posed to the moralistic human rights project by 
several species of scepticism.
42
 There are, as Beitz notes, a ‘variety of reasons why someone 
might doubt the meaningfulness of human rights talk or the practical significance or value of 
international human rights practice’.
43
 These reasons include a philosophical scepticism about 
the ostensibly universalistic pretentions of human rights, prompted by doubts about there 
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being a plausible foundation for their existence that does not depend on an unbearably 
controversial metaphysics.
44
 Griffin’s account of human rights, for example, is rooted in the 
thick metaphysical commitment that there is an ahistorical human nature with a 
corresponding set of universally shared individual interests.
45
 There is also a more pointedly 
political scepticism about the supposed utility – or even benignity – of human rights, which is 
encouraged by historical associations of the concept with the imperial ambitions of Western 
nation-states, as well as lingering suspicions of its ideological uses in support of 
contemporary military campaigns.
46
 Even if these forms of scepticism do not undermine the 
moral or intellectual force of human rights in the minds of its advocates, they nevertheless 
invite some response.  
 One response to scepticism about human rights is to recommend a complete rejection 
of the concept.
47
 Another response is, as discussed, the practice-based approach, which 
attempts to defend the political salience of the concept while stripping it of its moral content, 
thus avoiding the difficulties confronted by any controversially universalistic and ahistorical 
presuppositions. A pragmatist normative account can, by contrast, empower those who wish 
to defend the idea of human rights against such species of scepticism. It provides theoretical 
resources for those who accept that the concept of human rights must be analysed – first and 
foremost – as an idea rather than a practice, and who also think it an idea that is worth 
cherishing. The best-known pragmatist defence of human rights has been advanced by 
Richard Rorty.
48
 His philosophical articulation of the value of human rights – what he 
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describes as the ‘morally superior’ status of ‘human rights culture’ – is explicitly anti-
foundational, insofar as it rejects any attempt to account for it that relies on universalistic 
notions of rationality, whether they be Platonic or Kantian. He instead makes the case for the 
idea of human rights on the basis that it is ‘ours’, which links to his broader conception of 
philosophy as an exercise in conversation that aims to reconcile a culture to those traditions 
that are central to its self-understanding and to its ethical and aesthetic flourishing.
49
 One of 
Rorty’s most arresting contentions is that ‘the question of whether human beings really have 
the rights enumerated’ in international agreements ‘is not worth raising’.
50
 This sentiment 
obviously puts his approach at odds with both the moralistic and practice-based 
understandings of human rights, as each is centrally concerned – albeit in different ways – 
with the human rights we ‘really have’: in terms of either gleaning them from some account 
of our essential humanity, or through deference to established political reality.  
To justify human rights to the sceptic, in place of the foundationalist appeal to a 
universal human nature, Rorty emphasises the importance of a ‘sentimental education’, 
acquired through exposure to narratives of sufferance. Such an education enables affective 
responses, widening the circle of empathy: a commitment to it behoves us to identify ways 
for more people to ‘imagine themselves in the shoes of the despised and oppressed’.
51
 One of 
the consistent concerns in Rorty’s writing is a dethronement of the aspirations of philosophy, 
through his recommendation of its more explicit alignment with literature and a 
corresponding recoiling from any positivistic aping of the natural sciences. When it comes to 
discussions of normative issues, his view is that ‘novels rather than moral treatises are the 
most useful vehicles of moral education’.
52
 Crucially, however, it does not follow from this 
assessment of relative usefulness that Rorty thinks novels are the only such vehicles. Indeed, 
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in addition to his recommended technique of telling the ‘sad, sentimental story’ to broaden 
and deepen empathy, Rorty also points towards the form that anti-foundationalist and 
historicist philosophical discussions of normative issues might take.
53
 He puts forward the 
following pragmatist conception of the philosopher’s role when considering such issues: 
‘Philosophers like myself….see our task as a matter of making our own culture – the 
human rights culture – more self-conscious and more powerful, rather than of 
demonstrating its superiority to other cultures by an appeal to something transcultural. 
We think that the most philosophy can hope to do is summarize our culturally 
influenced intuitions about the right thing to do in various situations’.
54
 
 
On this understanding, the philosophical enterprise is a necessarily modest and limited one: 
the range of its moral enquiry is located within an established culture with its own collection 
of beliefs and traditions. It is important to emphasise that such beliefs and traditions do not 
necessarily limit the sorts of questions that philosophers can ask. The concern is not to set 
boundaries to the philosophical imagination. The historicist limitation here is rather a 
justificatory in nature, insofar as we should not expect our proposed answers to such 
questions to have purchase beyond the community within which our normative conversation 
is intelligible.
55
  
Within the context of our discussion, it is even more urgent to stress that the 
justificatory limitation demanded by Rorty does not imply any commitment to a specific 
philosophical method. His pragmatism does not have strict methodological implications. 
Although so much of Rorty’s writing diagnoses and advertises the problems with analytic 
philosophy, the main targets of his critiques are the myopic tendencies of its practitioners and 
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their (often unquestioned) commitment to scientism, rather than their actual mode of 
argumentation.
56
 It is the naturalistic, universalistic, and scientistic pretensions of the claims 
offered within strands of analytic philosophy that repel Rorty, rather than the established 
theoretical tools of the trade – conceptual analysis through appeals to ordinary language and 
dialectical reasoning – that he himself deploys across so much of his writing.
57
 Evidence for 
both Rorty’s methodological openness and his commitment to normative theorizing can be 
found in his admiration for the political philosophy of Rawls. Unlike many of Rawls’s 
original followers, Rorty not only endorses the core theses of his later (‘political not 
metaphysical’) work, but also thinks it consistent with his broader liberalism.
58
  
In The Law of Peoples, one of his final works, Rawls outlines his normative vision of 
international relations. Herein, Rawls argues that the domestic theory of political liberalism 
he developed in his earlier writing should not be thought extendable to the global sphere.
59
 
Instead of any universalistic version of his theory of ‘justice as fairness’, Rawls ascribes 
normative significance to the sovereignty of idealised, bordered communities of ‘peoples’. 
For the purposes of his theory, the legitimacy of such peoples is unthreatened by however 
‘arbitrary a society’s boundaries may appear from a historical point of view’ and depends 
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instead on their moral conduct.
60
 Within the global ‘realistic utopia’ that Rawls sketches, the 
various discrete peoples that occupy the world are assumed to be characteristically different, 
in terms of their forms of government, religious affiliations, and levels of internal pluralism. 
The view he defends in The Law of Peoples is that there is no normative requirement for such 
societies to be liberal. The political legitimacy of peoples thus depends neither on there being 
a constitution that is neutral between competing conceptions of the good, nor on the 
protection of a set of equally distributed liberal rights.  
Rawls’ restriction of his theory of justice to societies with established liberal and 
democratic constitutional traditions has outraged cosmopolitan critics, who regard his 
position as inconsistent with the moral commitments that undergird his domestic theory.
61
 
His normative theory of global politics is, however, endorsed by Rorty. When discussing 
Rawls’ theory, one of the things Rorty is keen to make sense of is a political philosophy that 
is universalistic in its ‘reach’, but particularistic in its ‘validity’.
62
 Rorty’s account of Rawls’ 
theory is somewhat underdeveloped, but the ostensibly paradoxical thought he offers is that it 
represents a culturally particularistic defence of universalistic normative values. But what 
element of Rawls’ international theory emerges as universalistic, if he is content to grant the 
legitimacy of peoples to pursue political arrangements that depart from liberal democratic 
norms? The answer – the key universalistic concept in his law of peoples – is human rights. 
The idea of human rights is pivotal in Rawls’ international theory: unlike those rights one 
                                                 
60
 Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 38. As well as defending the 
normative significance of bordered peoples, Rawls invokes the Kantian rejection of the practical possibility of 
world government to reject full political cosmopolitanism (The Law of Peoples, p. 36). 
61
 See, for example, Simon Caney, ‘Cosmopolitanism and the Law of Peoples’, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 10 (2002), pp. 95-123. For a compelling defence of the coherence and consistency of Rawls’ 
position, see Saladin Meckled-Garcia, ‘On the Very Idea of Cosmopolitan Justice: Constructivism and 
International Agency’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2008), pp. 245-71. 
62
 Rorty, ‘Justice as a Larger Loyalty’, pp. 50-51. 
23 
 
might expect to find in a ‘reasonable constitutional democratic regime’, they are ‘a special 
class of urgent rights’ that span otherwise legitimate borders.
63
  
In terms of the theoretical debate outlined earlier, Rawls’ understanding of human 
rights is regarded – with curious persistence – as an exemplification of the practice-
based/political approach, which Beitz suggests is ‘implicit’ in The Law of Peoples.
64
 Upon 
inspection, however, this is a misleading interpretation that should be corrected, both for the 
sake of interpretive accuracy, and because doing so shows how we can productively 
appreciate Rawls’s theory of human rights along pragmatist lines. The practice-
based/political interpretation stems from Rawls’ account of the particular ‘role’ that human 
rights have within his theory, as well as the absence of any naturalistic grounding for such 
rights therein. This role of human rights is, for Rawls, formally equivalent to that claimed by 
Beitz in his reality-based theorization of the international order. In addition to being 
‘necessary conditions of any system of social co-operation’, for Rawls, human rights act to 
‘restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and…specify limits to a regime’s 
internal autonomy’.
65
 The idea of human rights is also integral to Rawls’ typology of peoples, 
where it serves as a benchmark for their legitimacy. Within the international society that 
Rawls imagines, liberal peoples must extend toleration – understood as a politically 
demanding obligation of egalitarian recognition and civility
66
 – to legitimate (‘decent’) non-
liberal peoples, but not to what he calls ‘outlaw states’. One of the definitive features of 
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outlaw states is their flagrant rejection of the law of peoples through the violation of human 
rights, which can then generate the legitimate expectation of ‘forceful sanctions’ and even 
‘intervention’ from other peoples.
67
  
 As shown, the practice-based approach to human rights is fundamentally flawed 
because it ascribes interpretive authority for the understanding of political concepts to 
institutional manifestations of those concepts that are contingent and contestable. The first 
step towards uncovering the moral (rather than narrowly political) character of Rawls’ 
account of human rights involves understanding that, for him, the conceptual and normative 
meaning of this concept does not derive from – nor defer to – its practical role or institutional 
function in international society. For Rawls to hold a practice-based/political theory of human 
rights, he must think that its conceptual meaning is derived from its institutional nature or 
role. He does not. This interpretation may be widely accepted, but it is mistaken insofar as it 
essentially treats Rawls’s conclusion as though it were a premise. Unlike Beitz, Rawls does 
not approach his international normative theory with the concept of human rights already 
established or defined. The role of human rights in the world is not given or presupposed and 
Rawls does not use an assumed institutional existence as a starting point for theorizing 
international politics. He instead derives his conclusion about the role of human rights in 
international relations from a broader set of moral commitments. Rawls’ account of human 
rights cannot be separated from his whole normative international theory without 
misunderstanding its logic. His specific conclusion about the role of human rights in that 
theory thus provides no methodological blueprint for a practice-based analysis of that 
concept.
68
 He instead regards human rights as an idea that instantiates and expresses distinct 
normative values, which are then manifested in an international role. 
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 We can appreciate Rawls’ construal of human rights as a moral – rather than purely 
political – concept through a focus on two other central normative commitments that connect 
to it within his international theory: the ideas of decency and peoples. The role of decency in 
his theory is to provide an evaluative normative standard for the boundaries of toleration in – 
and a prerequisite for membership of – the society of peoples. For Rawls, the right to 
toleration that non-liberal societies are owed by their liberal counterparts is conditional on the 
satisfaction of this standard of decency with regards to both their internal and external 
conduct.
69
 In terms of their external relations, decent conduct means that such societies must 
be non-aggressive, peaceful, and committed to diplomacy and trade.
70
 In their internal 
organisation, peoples are defined as decent through their observance and protection of human 
rights, their established and publicly recognised system of moral obligations, and their 
adherence to a properly administered rule of law.
71
 Decency is evidently a thoroughly moral 
idea for Rawls – at no point does he make any reference to it as having a practical or 
institutional instantiation, and it is not clear how it could have – and his view is that the 
securement of its status depends on the protection of human rights. For him, human rights 
provide a ‘necessary, though not sufficient, standard for the decency of domestic political and 
social institutions’.
72
 
So, for Rawls, the idea of decency is supposed to capture a universal moral standard 
that liberal peoples can reasonably accept and expect from their non-liberal fellows, to secure 
their equal standing in global society. The second significant moral concept within Rawls’ 
international theory is the idea of peoples. It is an idiosyncratic notion within theories of 
international politics, which departs from Kant’s focus on nations, and the realist (Hobbesian) 
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focus on states. Rawls explicitly casts peoples as moral entities within his idealised schema. 
Peoples, unlike states, are not merely rational (in terms of seeking to satisfy their own 
interests) but also reasonable in a moral sense and therefore willing to agree and honour ‘fair 
terms of cooperation’.
73
 Whereas states are customarily ascribed ‘the traditional rights to war 
and to unrestricted internal autonomy’, peoples have a ‘moral character’ whose sovereignty is 
only ‘derived from the Law of Peoples itself’ rather than through independent claim or 
alternative external recognition.
74
 For Rawls, there is an inextricable relationship between the 
ascription of decency and the existence of peoples. Each of these is, in turn, bound up with 
his account of the moral sanctity of human rights. The recognition of human rights is a 
‘necessary’ condition for both the ascription of decency and the securement of a peoples’ 
status as such.
75
 Rawls’ claim is that the government of any bordered political territory that 
violates human rights effectively surrenders its status as part of the society of peoples through 
an assertion of the traditional autonomy associated with states.
76
 Unlike Beitz, who regards 
the presence of sovereign states as one of the ‘basic facts’ of the international order, for 
Rawls they are something of a moral aberration, indicative of a departure from an idealised 
normative standard and the eclipse of reasonableness by naked rationality. 
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls says very little about established practices and 
institutions in the international order. At no point does he appeal to them to generate 
authoritative accounts of conceptual or normative meaning. As far as the explicitly moral 
categories I have just outlined are concerned, he is explicit that ‘the Law of Peoples does not 
presuppose the existence of actual decent hierarchical peoples’ and that his account is 
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‘hypothetical’ and ‘idealised’.
77
 It should now be quite clear why it is a misreading of Rawls’ 
international theory to then ascribe him a practice-based/political understanding of human 
rights. When it comes to human rights, Rawls again does not derive the meaning of the 
concept from any pre-moral, or pre-ideational, political understanding. Although he does 
express a view about the function or role that human rights have in international society – one 
that notably departs in clear ways from both standard philosophical conceptions and from 
real-world legal practice – it is evidently a conclusion embedded in a normative theory rather 
than a premise that provides any kind of methodological blueprint for conceptual and 
normative analysis. Beitz is therefore mistaken to say that human rights are, for Rawls, 
‘constructed for certain political purposes’ if this is to be taken as contrasting with moral 
purposes and, in any case, it is their conceptual and normative nature that defines their 
political purpose rather than vice versa.
78
 Human rights, for Rawls, have the function that 
they do for moral reasons: they are an integral part of his normative framework, as an 
implication of the idea of decency and of his account of what makes a distinct society a 
recognisable moral agent in the world. The idea of human rights is a prominent ingredient in 
a comprehensive moral scheme, one that is unrelated to the established practices of the real-
world international order. Since human rights is a moral concept for Rawls, defined in 
ideational terms, his evidently cannot be a practice-based theory. 
Though it is demonstrably not practice-based, Rawls’ understanding of human rights 
also departs from the orthodox moral approach exemplified by Griffin. As discussed, Griffin 
attempts a philosophical articulation of human rights that is universalistic. It might be thought 
that Rawls does likewise with the abstract idea of decency, which is, after all, supposed to 
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have a universal form. As intimated, however, the main difference between Rawls and Griffin 
lies in the scope of justification for their theories. In The Law of Peoples, Rawls does not 
appeal to any standard of universal justification when offering his international normative 
theory. He offers a theory that is universalistic in some of its conceptual content – including 
through the idea of human rights as a global normative standard – but is nevertheless 
particularistic in terms of its scope. It is, in other words, directed towards members of 
communities with liberal and democratic traditions, and does not claim authority beyond that 
realm of justification.
79
 Griffin thus complains that The Law of Peoples ‘works outward’ from 
the perspective of a politically liberal society, whereas he is instead comfortable with a more 
substantive universalism, and is able even to entertain the possibility of ‘an objective 
justification of human rights authoritative for all rational beings’ that the pragmatist could not 
countenance.
80
 
Rawls’ ambition is not to provide a normative international theory with universal 
appeal or validity, but rather the far more modest goal of the elaboration of ‘the foreign 
policy of a reasonably just liberal people’.
81
 And, crucially, it is only to such a liberal 
audience that his theory could be justified.
82
 He is clear from the outset that ‘the Law of 
Peoples is developed within political liberalism’ and that ‘the reason we go on to consider the 
point of view of decent [non-liberal] peoples is not to prescribe principles of justice for 
them’.
83
 His theory does not attempt to justify a universalistic vision of political morality but 
rather offers a realistically utopian normative account of international society for liberal 
communities. It works outward from its own standpoint in perspectival terms, but ultimately 
looks inward in terms of the philosophical conversation of which it is part. In his 
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interpretation of Rawls, Beitz wrongly infers a practice-based/political reading from the 
rejection of naturalism in The Law of Peoples.
84
 A pragmatist reading of Rawls’ international 
theory shows that this conclusion does not follow: we can reject the naturalistic grounding for 
human rights assumed by Griffin while nevertheless conceiving of it as a fundamentally 
moral idea. 
The Law of Peoples exemplifies a pragmatist approach to normative questions at the 
international level. It is, recalling the language of Rorty, a provisional attempt to 
philosophically articulate – as compellingly as possible – the best available moral 
commitments of the culture within which it is located. It is an intervention that seeks to 
contest the normative meaning of the liberal and cosmopolitan traditions that characterise the 
political cultures that house and recognise them. This pragmatist understanding of Rawls’ 
overall project also points us towards a productive framework for fruitful – and 
correspondingly circumscribed – philosophical conversation about the content of the idea of 
human rights. This may at first seem unlikely. It might be worried that a pragmatist reading 
of Rawls’ international theory merely underscores its supposed conservatism about what 
human rights there are. Beitz suggests that the list of universal entitlements identified by 
Rawls falls short of ‘“human rights proper”’ because it does ‘not include the full complement 
of the rights found in the international law of human rights’.
85
 Griffin likewise disapproves of 
Rawls’ ‘shortened list’.
86
 This view of Rawls as offering a ‘minimalist’ account of the 
content of human rights is at once true and misleading. It is certainly the case that the list he 
provides is a significantly truncated one, designed to capture the moral commitments that 
decent peoples could – in the liberal imagination – unite behind.
87
 Among the few ‘urgent’ 
rights Rawls identifies as human rights are ‘the right to life…to liberty…and to formal 
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equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice’ as well as ‘freedom from slavery and 
serfdom’ and ‘security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide’.
88
 His list is clearly 
a minimalist one when contrasted with both international law and the UDHR.  
Rawls nevertheless seems clear that the specific list of human rights he offers is both 
provisional and contestable and his overall theory permits alternative, more generous 
interpretations. We can appreciate the provisional nature of Rawls’ substantive conception of 
human rights through further consideration of his explication of decency as the definitive 
measure for membership of the society of peoples. For him, a decent but non-liberal society – 
such as his imaginary Kazanistan – is one in which human rights are protected, but where 
there is a hierarchical, non-democratic form of government, as well as an absence of the full 
catalogue of rights found in a liberal society. One of Rawls’ suggested measures of decency 
for a hierarchical society is a meaningful commitment to representative processes, such that 
even where members of specific religious or ethnic groups are prohibited from involvement 
in decision-making procedures, they are still properly consulted through some means, and 
their interests regarded always as part of the public good.
89
 At a crucial, though overlooked, 
point of his discussion, Rawls addresses a particular challenge that such a hierarchical society 
might face to secure its decency and thus cement its status within the society of peoples. He 
considers the representation of ‘members of a [hierarchical] society, such as women, who 
may have long been subjected to oppression and abuse, amounting to the violation of their 
human rights’.
90
 Rawls’ view is that one way to respond to this historical legacy of 
oppression – and ensure the consultation of such a historically marginalised group – would be 
to insist that there be descriptive representation within the group consultation, such that the 
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inclusion of women is guaranteed.
91
 The importance of this descriptive representation would, 
in this instance, thus trump any value attached to the peoples’ established hierarchical 
structure, which could otherwise have guaranteed the formal exclusion of that marginalised 
group from political consultation.
92
  
We can identify a clear and important tension here between, on the one hand, the 
protection of the discretionary right of the non-liberal society to organise itself hierarchically 
and, on the other, the protection of human rights. In a revealing footnote, Rawls raises the 
possibility that ‘full democratic and liberal rights are necessary to prevent violations of 
human rights’ as a solution to this problem.
93
 He then explicitly recognises the potential 
legitimacy of this solution, acknowledging that such a conclusion – that there is a normative 
requirement for a human right to some degree of political participation – ‘may be true’ under 
such circumstances.
94
 He describes this as a truth to be determined by ‘empirical’ evidence 
rather than ‘conceptual’ argument. In other words, although he himself is not personally 
convinced that there necessarily is a human right to democratic participation, his theory is 
clearly open to the possibility that there may be such a right, depending on the force of the 
available empirical evidence. This openness to a more capacious understanding of which 
specific human rights are conceivable obviously helps cast Rawls’ own minimalist 
conception in a new light and illustrates how the theoretical framework he develops enables 
fruitful further thinking about the content and implications of that idea. In fact, we can 
appreciate how his understanding of human rights does not foreclose the sort of normative 
analysis undertaken by Griffin and others, provided its justificatory claims are appropriately 
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localised. Rawls’ approach invites an open-ended philosophical discussion about the specific 
content of human rights.  
 
Conclusion 
The aims of this paper have been to articulate a pragmatist framework for theorizing human 
rights and, in doing so, distinguish it from the recently ascendant practice-based approach 
with which it might wrongly be conflated. In the first part, I showed that the practice-based 
approach to human rights is defined by its ascription of conceptual and normative authority to 
practices and institutions, at the expense of abstract moral ideas. Drawing on Searle’s social 
ontology, I argued that the practice-based approach inevitably naturalises and reifies political 
institutions that are radically contingent, because it ignores the interpretive primacy that ideas 
must have for interpreting and contesting those institutions. Theorists of human rights need 
therefore to work with an ideational rather than practice-based understanding of the concept. 
In the second part, I outlined and commended an alternative, pragmatist account of human 
rights, which is ideational and moral rather than practice-based and political. I argued that a 
pragmatist reading of Rawls’ normative international theory is both interpretively accurate 
(and so undermines the orthodox understanding of it as the original source for the practice-
based approach), and also philosophically productive (in that it shows how the account of 
human rights in The Law of Peoples is an open-ended one capable of stimulating further 
debate about the normative demands of that idea). Rawls offers an exemplary theoretical 
articulation of a value that is universalistic in its substantive meaning, but particularistic in 
terms of the scope of its justification. 
It might be worried that Rawls’ pragmatism posits a reification of its own, through his 
commitment to the idea of traditions within which moral justification takes place and the 
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peoples/communities with whom it is intended to resonate.
95
 Does Rawls ascribe a concrete 
existence to entities that are, in fact, contingent, malleable, and porous? There are good 
reasons to think not. These reasons relate to the nature of traditions themselves and the 
communities that house them. Whereas practices and institutions can be reified when their 
ideational roots are forgotten, the fundamentally ideational character of the intellectual 
tradition that Rawls invokes means that it can only ever be claimed and contested: traditions 
have no essential characteristics but are rather constructed through theories like Rawls’. The 
Law of Peoples thus instantiates a contestation of the very liberal tradition that he appeals to. 
His theory is provisional in its content and is not presented as definitive of his community, 
not least because he acknowledges that there are ‘many liberalisms’.
96
 Rawls’ account of 
human rights and the content of the law of peoples can always be disputed through an 
alternative interpretation of the liberal tradition that it claims. It is also possible for his ideas 
to have salience and uptake beyond the community that is appealing to – his claim is just that 
we should not necessarily expect them to. ‘Peoples’ are therefore best understood as an 
idealised moral concept that draws on intellectual commitments that should be recognisable 
to members of a community with a liberal tradition, rather than thought to have any real 
existence. 
Another worry might be that a pragmatist reading of Rawls provides a vision of 
political impotence, with a particularistic justification threatening the universalism that gives 
human rights their unique normative force. One of the alleged weaknesses in Rorty’s account 
of human rights is that it effectively disables the concept, because its location in a specific 
community renders any trans-cultural critique illegitimate.
97
 Rawls himself is clear in his own 
theory that a commitment to human rights does not entail a politics of communitarian retreat, 
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but rather one of cosmopolitan outreach. For him, violations of human rights would – under 
the law of peoples – demand international policies such as economic sanctions, and military 
interventions in situations of moral emergency. Such violations do, of course, presuppose the 
enshrinement of the law of peoples, which, in turn, depends on there being a global consensus 
on the moral idea of decency. Since decency is the moral basis for human rights, Rawls 
thinks that it is not a peculiarly liberal value and therefore believes that such a global 
consensus is feasible. His belief in such feasibility must nevertheless ultimately be a matter of 
hope rather than certainty because of the circumscribed justificatory scope of his theory.   
As noted, the pragmatist account of human rights is necessarily tentative, provisional, 
and limited in terms of its normative authority. This means that the accounts of Rorty and 
Rawls are, by definition, incapable of providing a universalistic justification for the idea of 
human rights, even though that idea is universalistic in its form. Whether this appears to 
entail a political paradox will depend on what one thinks the philosophical enterprise can, or 
should, do. Any worry about the political disablement of human rights must presuppose the 
possibility of an alternative, universalistic theory that can tell the world exactly what human 
rights demand. If, however, one agrees with Rorty that the most political philosophy is 
capable of doing is providing the best possible articulation of normative values within 
traditions, then the worry about the universality of human rights evaporates. What we are left 
instead with is the hope that we can convince ourselves, our community, and then maybe 
others of the attractiveness of those values. When we look to other cultures and criticise them 
– through whatever means – for violating what we regard as human rights, we are advancing 
perhaps the most serious charge we have within our moral vocabulary, but it is nevertheless a 
contingent charge, and whether it implies the legitimacy of international intervention without 
the kind of global consensus about decency invited by Rawls must remain an open question.  
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 For Rawls, in our philosophical deliberations, ‘we must always start from where we 
now are’.
98
 In his international theory, he thus helps reimagine the nature of political 
philosophy, as a conversation that begins within shared intellectual traditions, rather than an 
activity that seeks anything more transcendent. Rawls is clear that The Law of Peoples is not 
a ‘treatise’ on international law, but rather his sketch of a realistic utopia within a specific 
cultural context.
99
 His approach is not relativistic, because it does not chain justificatory 
authority to existing traditions in such a way as close them off and accept existing beliefs and 
practices as they are; it rather allows those traditions to be contested through open enquiry in 
a manner that recognises both their contingency and our situatedness. A pragmatist reading of 
Rawls ultimately enables an avoidance of both moral and political culs-de-sac within recent 
philosophical discussions of human rights. It avoids the reification and naturalisation of 
established political arrangements that is an inevitable feature of the practice-based approach. 
It avoids what might be regarded as the naïve universalism of the moral approach, which 
mistakenly regards ethnocentrism as a justificatory problem to be overcome rather than a 
commitment that must be owned up to. The pragmatist account of human rights – demanded 
by Rorty and exemplified by Rawls – instead provides a path to follow that enables further 
normative philosophical conversations about an idea that is still regarded by many to be the 
crowning achievement of modernity. 
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